A. Sison – Handbook of Virtue Ethics in Business and Management (2017)

Описание

The objectives of this Handbook are threefold. Above all, it seeks to provide a
convenient reference work on the virtue ethics approach to business and management,
following both historical and systematic modes of inquiry. In order to do this,
however, it first has to identify the major authors and schools of thought as well as
their most significant contributions to virtue ethics scholarship. This constitutes the
second, subordinate goal. Thirdly, and as a consequence of the above, this work also
strives to critically examine the distinctive virtue ethics responses to the global
challenges that managers and business organizations face in the twenty-first century.
Among academic philosophers working in the mainstream of the Englishspeaking
world, virtue ethics had all but disappeared until the publication of
G.E.M. Anscombe’s article, “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Philosophy, 33: 1–19)
in 1958. Dominant then in the academe were deontology (Kant) and utilitarianism
(Bentham and Mill). Certainly, there was hardly a monolithic position characterizing
either one of these schools. Yet Anscombe, nonetheless, found Kant’s core idea of
“legislating for oneself” to be quite absurd, because legislation required acknowledging
a power superior to one, she argued, and given Kant’s agnosticism, such a
recourse to a “supreme law-giver” had become in fact impossible. At the same time,
she was equally critical of the utilitarian alternative. She held that ethics entailed that
certain actions were forbidden in themselves regardless of consequences, such as
dropping a bomb on an innocent civilian population just so that their army might
capitulate. Nevertheless, Anscombe did not directly endorse the development of
virtue ethics, due to what she perceived to be a lack of an “adequate philosophy of
psychology.”
The virtue ethics amnesia afflicting moral philosophy in general affected business
and management ethics as well. Deontology, which evaluates behavior exclusively
in its conformity with universal rules of justice and rights, without reference to
context or outcomes may have prevailed in theory, but utilitarianism, which judges
action through a cost-benefit analysis, without regard for norms or values has
dominated in practice. Anscombe herself had identified many of the difficulties
that beset virtue ethics. Firstly, the meaning of virtue in contemporary society was
no longer clear. Neither were there satisfactory accounts of basic concepts of moral
psychology such as “intention,” “desire,” “motive,” or “action.” Instead, there was widespread disagreement in the meaning and even of the existence of virtue-related
notions such as “human nature” and “flourishing.”
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, we still think that virtue ethics is a valid and
excellent option for ethics in general and for business ethics in particular, primarily
because it integrates the advantages of both deontology and utilitarianism while
providing cogent responses to the criticisms or objections arising from each one.
Virtue ethics, like deontology, subscribes to universal principles, and, like utilitarianism,
it considers overall results. But unlike deontology, virtue ethics pays attention
to the particulars of agents (motives, intentions, habits, character, relationships) and
actions (circumstances, community), and unlike utilitarianism, it maintains that
exceptionless prohibitions do exist. Quite distinctively, virtue ethics establishes a
two-way causal relation between what the agent does and who that agent becomes.
We believe that these combined features make virtue ethics a more integrated,
balanced, and nuanced framework than either deontology or utilitarianism from
which to evaluate human action.
Part I begins with a historical introduction and chronology of the development of
virtue ethics, providing a comprehensive assessment of its evolution and identifying
the most influential authors and works. These may be divided into authors who
follow (1) a philosophical or conceptual tradition in their treatment of virtue and
those who belong to the research traditions of (2) social science and positive science,
in particular, empirical, quantitative, and applied psychology.
Following are some of the issues discussed. It is indeed noteworthy that Aristotle,
to cite an ancient author, or MacIntyre, to cite a modern one, be called upon to
provide a basis for virtue ethics applied to business, given their highly critical views
of a “life dedicated to money-making” and capitalism, respectively. From this
perspective, it seems to make more sense to have recourse to Adam Smith who,
after all, is the father of modern economics and the philosopher of modern commercial
society par excellence. Yet how are we to reconcile a purported Smithian virtue
ethics with the utilitarian currents underlying The Wealth of Nations? Would the
recourse to a complementary Theory of Moral Sentiments be enough to warrant such
an attribution? Virtue ethics has often been aligned and identified with Catholic
Social Teaching. But Catholic Social Teaching unequivocally presents itself as part
of moral theology. Does that not constitute an important limitation to virtue ethics’
claims of universality? Consistent with most legal thinking is Natural Law theory’s
focus on setting the minimum or lower limits of what is tolerable or acceptable
behavior in society. So what are we to make of New Natural Law theory’s claims not
only to promote virtue in business and economics but also to create wealth?
Although feminist ethics and the ethics of care may not share many of the assumptions
of traditional virtue ethics, they nonetheless have in common a sensitivity to
particulars and a reproval of abstract principles of justice. Similarly, Confucianism,
with its emphasis on the collective, such as the family or society, over the individual,
and its unrelenting search for the ideal of harmonious living.
Occupying the front and center of the Austrian School of Economics’ attention is
the individual acting person, in its search of a universal logic of freedom. These
behavioral rules manifest themselves primarily in the market. How can the market be supportive, rather than hostile, to virtue? As philosophers team up with welfare
economists, political scientists, and sociologists in developing a capabilities
approach to the objective of “integral human development,” what new insights can
be gained regarding virtue’s role? Can virtue be accounted for in accordance with the
empirical, quantitative, and predictive paradigms of modern scientific psychology?
Is virtue a character and personality trait or simply a beneficial outcome of the
situation or environment? Beyond the treatment of pathologies, how useful are the
virtues in enabling human beings not only to do well, but also to do good, in
accordance with the aims of Positive Organizational Scholarship?
Part II continues with systematic approaches and major themes developed in
virtue ethics. Contributions here may be conceptual, empirical, and applied or case
studies. A first group deals with different topics to which virtue ethics has been
applied; a second group, with how virtue ethics has influenced various operational
areas or departments of the firm; and a third group, with virtue ethics responses to
some of the major issues currently besetting businesses and organizations.
Thus we consider whether the attribution of virtues to both individuals and
organizations is univocal, analogical, or simply metaphorical, and equivocal. We
also return to the old Socratic chestnut of whether virtue can be taught, and if so,
how, given today’s pedagogical methods. We analyze how virtue affects simultaneously
an agent’s knowledge and desires, such that it alters the whole decisionmaking
process. We look into the relationship between the intellectual virtues and
moral virtues, on the one hand, and human flourishing or eudaimonia, on the other.
We examine the possibility of “virtuous jurisprudence,” in a manner that preserves
personal autonomy and the good. We study how, from an unlikely Weberian
framework, virtue interrelates with spirituality and management, particularly in the
case of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. And we realize how
genuine leadership is revealed not only in grandiose feats or conquests but also in
ordinary gestures where virtue can be embedded.
Still within the principal-agent relationship in which corporate governance is cast,
we delve into the “board-level” virtues and their repercussions for organizations.We
enumerate the most significant virtues in marketing, such as honesty, fairness,
respect, and so forth, as well as opposing vices, such as “greenwashing,” with
special reference to children and other vulnerable populations. Friendship is put
forward as a practical model for collaborative supply-chain management. Virtues are
incorporated into organizational ethics to enhance human resource management
policies. And the different virtues needed for creating, sharing, absorbing, and
using knowledge in the information and communication technology sector (ICT)
are explained.
An essay on the virtue of global solidarity defined as “love for the common good”
anchors one of the final sections.We learn about the most important virtues – justice,
moderation, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, and generosity – for institutions
such as the State and the market. We get a glimpse of what “virtuous sustainable
development” could be like.
In this way, we hope to offer a comprehensive view of the state of virtue ethics
scholarship in business and management without untowardly sacrificing depth,
pluralism, and nuance.
Now comes the most pleasant task of acknowledging our gratitude to all the
people who have generously collaborated with us in this project: contributors;
section editors; our copy editor, Mary Baker; and our editors at Springer, especially
Annalea Manalili, Michael Hermann, and Neil Olivier.
This would not have been possible without you. It is as much yours as it is ours.
Thank you very much.